made forthrightly by the then WHO Director-General, Gro Harlem Brundtland, in direct criticism of the Chinese government.
The enthusiastic reader can easily engage in the blow-by-blow detail. This is a classic tale of medical drama, intrigue, investigation, political cover-up, and human foible. Yet much of the book's value lies in its first and final chapters which set the issue in wider context and explore the significance for future pandemic risks. The opening chapter explores how the modern world creates diverse opportunities for the emergence and spread of human infectious diseases. Since the mid-1970s a complex mix of social, environmental, commercial, bio-technical, and behavioural influences has caused several dozen new infectious diseases to appear and others to rebound. Abraham examines the emergence of HIV, the Nipah Virus disease, monkeypox in southern USA, and successive pandemics of cholera. These illustrate the increasing potency of, respectively: changes in sexual mores, international tourism, and medical technology (blood transfusion); massive regional environmental changes and intensified livestock production; international trade in exotic pet animals; and the rapidity and reach of modern overland and sea travel. In two of the author's less felicitous phrases, today's societies are 'uniquely vulnerable' despite their 'infinitely sophisticated' modern defences. This was the backdrop to SARS.
Most recent books about this topic area (nearly all by American authors) have used a militaristic idiom to evoke a battle between men and microbes entailing attack, defence, invaders, enemies, battles, conquest, winning, and losing. This book, too, strays often into that idiom. Indeed, the author tells us that 'the analogy of war' echoes throughout the SARS story. This is unfortunate, since the meta-lesson from recent experience is that infectious agents are a natural, non-negotiable, part of our world. They too are engaged in a struggle to survive and thrive. With genetic agility, they adapt quickly to the new niches that we restless, intrusive, humans create. This adaptation is done out of self-interest without malign intent. Certainly, within the infected individual there is defence and counter-attack by the body's immune system and, often, subterfuge by the infectious agent. But at the population level, and over time, we the human species cannot 'conquer' the microbial world in any lasting sense. Rather, we must learn to cohabit judiciously and to protect ourselves.
The final chapter discusses the significance of SARS for our inevitable future transactions with the microbial world. This brief outbreak highlighted defects in national health systems, in international data-sharing, in pandemic preparedness and in our readiness to constrain the often increasingly intensive animal -human -microbe contacts that escalate the likelihood of new zoonotic infectious diseases. Compared to the millions of deaths threatened by a new human-transmissible strain of avian influenza, the spectre raised by current stirrings of the unusually lethal H5N1 avian influenza virus, the SARS outbreak was a modest event. SARS may have helped us learn the larger lessons about the conditions that predispose to such new infections and about the dimensions of public health preparedness that will be needed, both nationally and internationally.
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One of the most striking aspects of the SARS epidemic was its timeliness in giving form to the slew of recent warnings about the threat from emerging infectious diseases. SARS was, of course, far from the first new infectious disease to appear but it was, and for the moment remains, the only one to be efficiently transmitted by respiratory means. As had been predicted, it spread rapidly across borders with the help of air travel. As had
